

Shannon's Theory of Secure Communication

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Introduction

- Last time, we have seen various cryptosystems, and some cryptanalyses
- How do you ascertain the security of a cryptosystem?
- Some reasonable ideas:
 - **Computational Security**: best alg takes a long time
 - This is impossible to achieve
 - Can be done against specific attacks (brute-force search)
 - **Provable Security**: reduce the security of a cryptosystem to a problem believed (or known) to be hard
 - **Unconditional Security**: Cryptosystem cannot be broken even with infinite computation power

Review of Probability Theory

- Security generally expressed in terms of probability
 - Because an attacker can always guess the key!
 - This is true of any cryptosystem, and unavoidable
- We only need discrete probabilities for now

Probability Distributions

- Probability space: (Ω, Pr)
 - Ω , the **sample space**, is a finite set of possible worlds (or possible outcomes)
 - Pr is a function $\mathcal{P}(\Omega) \rightarrow [0,1]$ such that
 - $\text{Pr}(\Omega) = 1$
 - $\text{Pr}(\emptyset) = 0$
 - $\text{Pr}(A \cup B) = \text{Pr}(A) + \text{Pr}(B)$ if $A \cap B = \emptyset$
 - Pr is called a **probability distribution**, a **probability measure**, or just a probability
- Because of additivity, Pr determined by $\text{Pr}(\{a\}) \forall a$

Examples

- Single dice:

- $\Omega = \{1,2,3,4,5,6\}$

- $\Pr(\{4\}) = 1/6$

- $\Pr(\{1,3,5\}) = 3/6 = 1/2$

- Pair of dice:

- $\Omega = \{(1,1),(1,2),(1,3),(1,4),\dots,(6,5),(6,6)\}$

- $\Pr(\{(1,1)\}) = 1/36$

- $\Pr(\{(1,a) \mid a=1,2,3,4\}) = 4/36 = 1/9$

Joint Probabilities

- Suppose (Ω_1, \Pr_1) is a probability space
- Suppose (Ω_2, \Pr_2) is a probability space
- Can create the **joint probability space** $(\Omega_1 \times \Omega_2, \Pr)$ by taking:
 - $\Pr(\{a, b\}) = \Pr_1(\{a\})\Pr_2(\{b\})$
 - Extending by additivity

Conditional Probability

- $\Pr(A | B) = \Pr(A \cap B) / \Pr(B)$
 - Only defined if $\Pr(B) > 0$
- More easily understood with a picture...

Bayes' Theorem: $\Pr(B | A) = \Pr(A | B) \Pr(B) / \Pr(A)$

Random Variables

- A **random variable** is a function from worlds to some set of values
- Given probability space and a random variable X , the probability that the random variable X takes value x is:

$$\Pr (\{w \mid X(w)=x\})$$

- This is often written $\Pr(X=x)$ **YUCK** or $\Pr[x]$ **YUCK²**

- The probability space is often left implicit

- Conditional probabilities:

$$\Pr (X=x \mid Y=y) = \Pr (\{w \mid X(w)=x\} \mid \{w \mid Y(w)=y\})$$

- X and Y are **independent** if $P(X=x \cap Y=y) = \Pr(X=x) \Pr(Y=y) \forall x,y$

Application to Cryptography

- Suppose a probability space (Ω, \Pr) with:
 - Random variable K (=key)
 - Random variable P (=plaintext)
 - K and P are independent random variables
 - Simple example: worlds are (key,plaintext) pairs
- Key probability is $\Pr(K=k)$
- Plaintext probability is $\Pr(P=x)$

Ciphertext Probability

- This induces a probability over ciphertexts:

$$\Pr(C = y) = \sum_{x, k \bullet e_k(x) = y} \Pr(P = x) \Pr(K = k)$$

- Can compute conditional probabilities:

$$\Pr(C = y \cap P = x) = \Pr(P = x) \sum_{k \bullet e_k(x) = y} \Pr(K = k)$$

$$\Pr(C = y \mid P = x) = \sum_{k \bullet e_k(x) = y} \Pr(K = k)$$

$$\Pr(P = x \mid C = y) = \frac{\Pr(P = x) \sum_{k \bullet e_k(x) = y} \Pr(K = k)}{\sum_{x', k \bullet e_k(x') = y} \Pr(P = x') \Pr(K = k)}$$

Perfect Secrecy

- We say a cryptosystem has **perfect secrecy** if

$$\Pr (P=x \mid C=y) = \Pr (P=x) \quad \text{for all } x,y$$

- The probability that the plaintext is x given that you have observed ciphertext y is the same as the probability that the plaintext is x (without seeing the ciphertext)
- Depends on key probability and plaintext probability

Characterizing Perfect Secrecy

Theorem: The shift cipher, where all keys have probability $1/26$, has perfect secrecy if we use the key only once, for any plaintext probability.

- Can we characterize those cryptosystems with perfect secrecy?

Theorem: Let (P,C,K,E,D) be a cryptosystem with $|K| = |P| = |C|$. This cryptosystem has perfect secrecy if and only if all keys have the same probability $1/|K|$ and

$$\forall x \in P \quad \forall y \in C \quad \exists k \in K \quad \bullet \quad e_k(x) = y$$

Vernam Cipher

- Also known as the **one-time pad**
- $P = C = K = (\mathbb{Z}_2)^n$
 - Strings of bits of length n
- If $K = (k_1, \dots, k_n)$:
 - $e_K(x_1, \dots, x_n) = (x_1 + k_1 \pmod{2}, \dots, x_n + k_n \pmod{2})$
 - $d_K(x_1, \dots, x_n) = (x_1 - k_1 \pmod{2}, \dots, x_n - k_n \pmod{2})$
- To encrypt a string of length N , choose a one-time pad of length N

Conclusions

- If ciphertexts are short (same length as key), can get perfect security
 - Approach still used for very sensitive data (embassies, military, etc)
- But keys get very long for long messages
- And there is the whole key distribution problem
- Modern cryptosystems: one key used to encrypt long plaintext (by breaking it into pieces)
 - We will see more of these next time
- Need to be able to reason about reusing keys

10 minutes break

A Detour: Entropy

- **Entropy**: measure of uncertainty (in bits) introduced by Shannon in 1948
 - Foundation of Information Theory
- Intuition
 - Suppose a random variable that takes value $\{1, \dots, n\}$ with some nonzero probability
 - Consider the string of values generated by that probability distribution
 - What is the most efficient way (in number of bits) to encode every value to minimize how many bits it take to encode a random string?
- Example: $\{1, \dots, 8\}$, where 8 is much more likely than others

Definition of Entropy

- Let random variable take values in finite set V

$$H(X) = - \sum_{v \in V} \text{Pr}(X = v) \log_2 \text{Pr}(X = v)$$

- Weighted average of $-\log_2 \text{Pr}(X=v)$

Theorem: Suppose X is a random variable taking n values with nonzero probability, then

$$H(X) \leq \log_2(n)$$

- When do we have equality?

Huffman Encoding

Algorithm to get a $\{0,1\}$ encoding that takes less than $H(X)+1$ bits on average

1. Start with a table of letter probabilities
2. Create a list of trees, initially all trees with only a letter and associated probability
3. Iteratively:
 - a. Pick the two trees T_1, T_2 with smallest probabilities from the list
 - b. Create a small tree with edge 0 leading to T_1 and edge 1 leading to T_2
 - c. Add that tree back to the list, with probability the sum of the original probabilities
4. Stop when you get a single tree giving the encoding

Conditional Entropy

- Let X and Y be random variables
- Fix a value y of Y
- Define the random variable $X|y$ such that
$$\Pr(X|y = x) = \Pr(X=x | Y=y)$$

$$H(X | y) = - \sum_{v \in V} \Pr(X = v | Y = y) \log_2 \Pr(X = v | Y = y)$$

- Conditional entropy, written $H(X|Y)$:

$$H(X | Y) = \sum_y \Pr(Y = y) H(X | y)$$

- Intuition: average amount of information about X that remains after observing Y

Application to Cryptography

- **Key equivocation** $H(K | C)$: amount of uncertainty of the key that remains after observing the ciphertext

$$\text{Theorem: } H(K | C) = H(K) + H(P) - H(C)$$

- A **spurious key** is a possible key, but incorrect
 - E.g., shift cipher, with ciphertext WNAJW
 - Possible keys: $k=5$ (RIVER) or $k=22$ (ARENA)
- Many spurious keys \longrightarrow Good!

How Many Spurious Keys?

- Question: how long of a message can we permit before the number of spurious keys is 0?
 - That is, before the only key that is possible is the right one?
- This depends on the underlying language in which plaintexts are taken
- Cf: cryptanalysis, where we took advantage that not all letters have equal probability in English messages

Entropy of a Language

- H_L = number of information bits per letter in language L

- Example:

- If all letters have the same probability, a first approximation would be 4.7

- For English, based on probabilities of plaintexts (letters), a first approximation is 4.19

- For pairs of letters? Triplets of letters? ...

- Entropy of L:

$$H_L = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{H(P^n)}{n}$$

- Redundancy of L:

$$R_L = 1 - \frac{H_L}{\log_2 |P|}$$

Unicity Distance

Theorem: Suppose (P,C,K,E,D) is a cryptosystem with $|C| = |P|$ and keys are chosen equiprobably, and let L be the underlying language. Given a ciphertext of length n (sufficiently large), the expected number of spurious keys s_n satisfies

$$s_n \geq \frac{|K|}{|P|^{nR_L}} - 1$$

- The **unicity distance** of a cryptosystem is the value n_0 after which the number expected number of spurious keys is 0.
 - Average amount of ciphertext required for an adversary to be able to compute the key (given enough time)
- Substitution cipher: $n_0 = 25$
 - So have a chance to recover the key if encrypted message is longer than 25 characters